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Boston University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 2019 
ABSTRACT 
 At every turning point in our daily lives, we are exposed to information in the 
hopes of persuasion and changing our minds. But, what if none of this new information is 
actually doing anything to convince us? Political scientists have long been obsessed with 
this age-old question of what impact information exposure has on people, with the aim of 
determining how it can influence a democracy. Much of the current work, however, is 
either outdated or addresses too many factors at once. This piece, specifically, is aimed at 
examining the effects of social media on information exposure. When you interact with a 
post on Facebook that you either agree or disagree with, under what circumstances does 
that information actually impact your beliefs? Does it merely reinforce what you already 
believe or does it actively change what your opinion is? So, this thesis examines 
specifically what effect social media in particular has on the observational mind. The 
hope in examining this field is clarifying whether outreach across social media and 
educational information actually makes a difference in changing people’s mindsets and, 
in turn, their voting behavior. How can we expect to “win” people over to our sides, if the 
information that we are presenting them is meaningless?
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1 
Introduction 
 We live in an age of information. At every turning point, our days are filled and 
flooded with information technology that has exposed us to knowledge in ways that 
scientists in the past could never have dreamed of. Our pockets are the homes of devices 
whose storage exceeds any computer first developed in the 1970s. Our portable, 
touchable, interactive screens are the gateway to an abundance of data, statistics, articles, 
news reports, documentaries, movies, reflections, editorials, and more. Our information 
exchange is wide and grand; it is not limited to the sole sources before. The emergence of 
the twenty-first century has introduced a new way for information and politics to be 
disseminated – social media. This is a phenomenon that you have likely directly 
experienced firsthand. As you scroll through your Facebook account or personal social 
media, it is nearly impossible to avoid seeing an article re-posted by a friend who either 
disagrees or resonates with the message articulated. And, their hope in posting is to 
convince you one way or another. In addition, you might imagine that with the 
inexhaustible list of Google searches regarding any topic you could research, that people 
could almost mindlessly and endlessly look for data on any such topic. 
However, it is essential to keep in mind that not all information is the same. While 
much information presents itself as factual data or observable phenomena, it takes other 
forms such as op-eds, persuasive pieces, and even media bias aimed at propagating a 
specific political agenda. The American obsession with information is so great that 
President Trump, at his press conference since election day in January of 2017, uttered 
the now infamous phrase “fake news” and popularized it for the alt-right. Suddenly, this 
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oxymoronic phrase was used to describe certain news outlets that allegedly reported on 
facts these groups found to be erroneous. If there is such a high availability of 
information, the preponderance of ‘fake’ news ought to be low. Trump’s main purpose in 
bringing up the idea of the fake news is to both questions the news sources from which he 
believes the masses are basing their opinions and also to invalidate the opinions that they 
hold. This, in turn, raised the question of how severely access to news information 
actually impacts people’s opinion. Though the case of Trump might reckon that that 
answer is low, I am more optimistic.  
Trump’s claim that fake news bears such a strong hold and presence in the world 
of politics is certainly an interesting one, but it is one that has been explored repeatedly in 
political science. Time and time again, researchers are looking at questions as to how 
misinformation affects participants’ outlooks. These studies are focused primarily on how 
exposure to false information, such as the fake news Trump believes exists, is having 
impacts on individual choices, voting, policy outlook options, and elections. This policy 
realm is certainly interesting, but I am more interested in how exposure to information 
affects people. I’m not necessarily concerned in how misinformation affects people, but 
rather how exposure to new information would actively (or not) change an individual’s 
perception regarding a policy issue. Granted, those specific questions seem to have been 
explored in political science within the last fifty years. However, the prominence of 
social media came about somewhat later, and the majority of political science analyses 
have not accounted for social media (understandably so). So, if we are ever to arrive at 
the definitive answer regarding how information affects people, we also need  
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My main motivations for my research design are rooted largely in the discussions 
and topics of a class that I took with Professor Spencer Piston during my senior year of 
college and the first semester of the Master’s portion of the BAMA. I remember that one 
week in particular focused on the media and its influence and role in the American 
political structure. I was captivated by and genuinely curious about the impact that the 
news had. What role do these news outlets and social media sites play in determining 
how people’s minds are swayed. One reading in particular, by Iyengar and Kinder (whose 
claims I will be addressing in the literature review), made me question how important 
data and information is. I’ve sought to put a “modern twist” to their findings and see just 
how applicable they might be to the devices that millions of people store in their pockets 
each and every day. My second motivation for this research topic is the fact that I 
constantly see friends and family members post news articles on Facebook or other social 
media. Although I might often take the time to read them (sometimes, frankly, I roll my 
eyes when I see certain sources that people choose to repost), I’m not always swayed by 
the arguments presented. But, other times (often when the ideology of either the author or 
the general sentiment of the pieces matches with my own), the information does either 
change or expand my opinion. Are they sharing those articles in vain or in a genuine 
attempt to convince the reader to think differently or confirm their beliefs? Why is it the 
case that some information sways opinion but others do not? There seems to be quite a 
divergence of thought on how information affects the political system, and my hope is to 
further explore how exposure to information affects people and what this means for the 
political system at large. More broadly, this field certainly has more grave implications 
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regarding democracies and ensuring a well-informed public. How can we expect to 
change people’s opinions, either in favor or against an opinion, if we can’t accurately 
determine how prone those opinions are to changing in the first place when people are 
exposed to information? If exposure to new information is not impacting people’s 
opinions, then most editorial pieces, persuasive articles, and even news outlets are 
useless. If new information cannot change people’s opinions, then engaging in political 
discourse or political education is futile. So, my work aims to examine these questions 
and delve into the world of information exposure and opinion changes.  
 In exploring my topic, I was first fascinated by a psychological theory known as 
selective exposure.1 It prevails in media and communication research for its ability to 
describe an individual’s tendency to favor information which reinforces their pre-existing 
views while ignoring information that contradicts that person’s held-opinion.2 
Confirmation bias is a form of selective exposure. For example, if you previously held a 
belief and are subsequently exposed to a piece of information that supports what you 
already believe, you are statistically more likely to agree with the sentiment of the article 
and believe it to be a credible source. In reality, however, that news source merely 
reaffirmed and “confirmed’ your prior understandings and thoughts – a clear cut case of 
                                                
1 Kenski, Henry C. “Contemporary Sociology.” Contemporary Sociology, vol. 22, no. 5, 
1993, pp. 738–739. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/2074664. 
2 Hart, William et al. “Feeling validated versus being correct: a meta-analysis of selective 
exposure to information” Psychological bulletin vol. 135,4 (2009): 555-88. 
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confirmation bias and selective exposure. The reason this theory seems relevant is, 
because it seemingly defines some of my expected findings for policy areas such as race. 
I expect that people will “select” which information it is that further confirms their beliefs 
while neglecting any opposing views. Selective exposure will be measured in the 
research design by noting how frequently people stick to their prior beliefs even after the 
exposure to new information. If an individual stays firm and reinforces their prior beliefs 
while ignoring any new facts of data, they likely were the proponents of selective 
exposure. 
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Literature Review  
After further research, I learned that a similar theory dominates my research field 
in political science; it is known as motivated reasoning. Motivated reasoning explains the 
underlying cognitive choices that lead voters to think the way that they do, relating it 
back to their previously mentioned opinions. To say that motivated reasoning has not 
been extensively research before would be foolish. However, it is important to note that 
the policy realms that I am looking at are inherently different from previous research on 
political motivated reasoning. The majority of the research that currently exists on 
political reasoning seems to deal with the same subjects over and over again. Those 
subjects seem to repeatedly be global warming, climate change, or conspiracy theories 
such as President Obama being Muslim or born in another country. The hope of the 
authors in each of these political questions is to see whether people respond differently to 
these controversial topics when they are provided with new information about the 
subject. The new information is intended to enlighten and shift previously held opinions, 
although the outcome is not always the same as the intent. We began to see a shift away 
from these repeat topics with the works of the following famous political scientists. 
Milton Lodge and Charles Taber’s The Rationalizing Voter seems to diverge from these 
prior topics, and deals mostly with contextual clues and environmental factors and 
examining how those impact voters’ opinions subconsciously. The lab experiments in 
that book do not deal exclusively with specific policy issues, which I hope to look at, but 
rather looks at specific stimuli (such as how playing upbeat music and showing patriotic 
symbols during a campaign ad affect a voter’s perception of that ad). It does not deal 
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specifically with political information, but rather how voters react to environmental 
stressors. So, Milton and Lodge, although they contributed heavily to the field of 
motivated reasoning, do not seek to answer the same questions that I am looking at. They 
are concerned with specific stimuli impacting behavior and what people believe about 
certain issues, whereas I am specifically looking at how new information (in a controlled 
situation with no change in external stimuli) might impact an individual’s decision-
making process. 
Further research, such as Adam Enders’ Information Cues, Partisan-Motivated 
Reasoning, and the Manipulation of Conspiracy Beliefs, falls short in the same light. This 
piece not only falls victim to the same issue of looking at conspiracy theories, but it also 
focuses more on contextual cues such as whether Democratic-identifiers in a piece makes 
a reader more likely to agree or disagree with the findings.3 Unlike Taber and Lodge, 
Ender is not examining specifically external stimuli to which people are exposed, but 
rather is taking a look at whether specific clues embedded within the news information 
changes a person’s opinions. Here, Ender is looking for cues impacted motivated 
reasoning which are inherently embedded into the information source that the participant 
is purposely exposed to. Again, it is not specifically exposure to information that is at the 
                                                
3 Adam M. Enders & Steven M. Smallpage (2018) Informational Cues, Partisan-
Motivated Reasoning, and the Manipulation of Conspiracy Beliefs, Political 
Communication, DOI: 10.1080/10584609.2018.1493006 
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forefront here, but instead the contextual cues dictating how people are going to behave. 
So, it is clear that one of the potential downfalls of current research on motivated 
reasoning is that it focuses on very specific topics and not broader policy realms. What 
makes my research different is that it directly seeks to establish the link between 
exposure to information and broader political topics. It would not look solely at 
conspiracy theories or the issue of global warming, but would hope to establish broader 
implications for policy realms such as the economy or race. The field of motivated 
reasoning is unfortunately lacking in establishing standards for how opinion changes 
across specific policy realms, instead of highly specific issues as those mentioned prior. 
In addition, my work will not be examining the same cues that Taber, Lodge, and Ender 
studied. Instead it is the sole exposure of information and method that is in question. My 
research will hope to determine whether the source of the information – whether it be a 
reputable news source or an online social media post – plays an impact in changing an 
individual’s opinion.  
Similar steps are taken by Lewandosky et al when trying to determine why certain 
groups of people are more likely to believe that vaccines cause autism (important to note, 
another widely popular conspiracy theory).4 Here, the authors focus more on how 
misinformation spreads and why it remains prominent in people’s minds. Mainly, they 
                                                
4 Lewandowsky, Stephan, et al. “Misinformation and Its Correction: Continued Influence 
and Successful Debiasing.” Psychological Science in the Public Interest, vol. 13, no. 3, 
2012, pp. 106–131., www.jstor.org/stable/23484653. 
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attribute these widespread beliefs to several main factors, including rumors and fiction, 
vested interest groups, politicians, and the media. Importantly, the authors bring up a 
series of reasons that align with Taber and Lodge’s findings, which are ones that I do not 
inherently disagree with. Namely, they suggest that citizens are concerned with 
determining whether information is “compatible” with that which they already believe, 
whether the source is promising, or whether reactance (people do not like being told what 
to do and the effects) occurs. There was no specific experiment conducted here, but rather 
a more philosophical narrative that explains the dangers of misinformation. The downfall 
in doing so is that the authors do not rely on much data to come to their conclusion, 
which is guided by misinformation and not necessarily information exposure. This 
difference is essential to understanding the underlying argument. Whereas 
misinformation focuses on people either being exposed to false information and/or acting 
off those false beliefs, information exposure is concerned with how facts and data are 
impacting people’s beliefs. Further, the experiment in this analysis will further look at 
how source cues might play a role.  
There is definitely a lot of existing literature regarding misinformation as well. 
The first relevant piece to dissect is Iyengar and Kinder’s News that Matters: Television 
and Public Opinion. Iyengar and Kinder present a finding that goes against previous 
work that television news coverage had no political impact or influence on people’s 
opinions about the most pressing issues for the nations. They challenge Patterson and 
McClure’s previous findings, arguing instead that television news coverage plays an 
active role in determining what issues people care the most about. One concept that I 
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think can be further explored is whether the impact of news coverage influencing 
political opinion still holds true no matter what the issue being covered is. For example, 
Iyengar and Kinder mention unemployment as one issue that respondents viewed; what 
about other political issues, such as race? The authors do observe the “priming effect” on 
different issues, but those issues revolve nearly entirely around the economy or defense 
spending. A further limitation of Iyengar and Kinder’s piece is that it fails to address 
“unadulterated network news broadcasts.”5 Namely, their test subjects were exposed to 
cables news with competing ideologies and even political advertisements; thus, “it 
remains unclear what happens when there are strongly competing agendas within 
network news, from political advertising or from other media.”6 Therefore, it is 
impossible to attribute whether the responses to the cable news were as a result of the 
news broadcasting or whether it was the result of some other factor, such as the political 
advertisements. Because it is impossible to pinpoint precisely what caused the observed 
shift in cables news interests, it is impossible to completely attribute the priming effect to 
the broadcastings. The final limitation with Iyengar and Kinder’s piece worth noting is 
that their experiment focuses exclusively on the effects of cable news television in 
swaying or reinforcing participants’ opinion. It does not take into account other media 
                                                
5 Drechsel, Robert E. “The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 504, 
1989, pp. 153–154. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/1046625. 
6 Ibid. 
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forms, such as newspapers, articles, or others; more importantly, given the fact that the 
piece was originally published in 1987, Iyengar and Kinder were unable to observe the 
effects of social media or mobile technology in spreading information and how that might 
impact individual opinion. Because social media did not yet exist, they could not 
effectively study that and their findings are limited to effects in television broadcasting 
and not other forms of media.  
All three of these limitations that I mentioned will be addressed in my research. 
Predominantly, an extension of Iyengar and Kinder’s original work is necessary in order 
to determine whether their conclusions are salient across policy areas. It is not 
satisfactory to say that the priming effect can be observed when the authors only looked 
at the phenomena as it applied namely to the presidency, to the economy, and to the 
defense spending, which are the three most frequently mentioned  policy topics 
throughout the book. We need to determine whether priming can be applied to race, 
which is barely mentioned in the book. In fact, race is mentioned for barely four pages in 
chapter four when the authors were trying to determine whether there was correlation 
between sympathy and the race of an unemployed person portrayed in the TV news. The 
most promising, yet still brief, section found that people were more likely to rate 
unemployment as an important national issue when the portrayed victim was white, 
instead of black; however, it is important to note again that this does not constitute 
exposure to information, making Iyengar and Kinder’s piece inconclusive for my specific 
research interests. Second, in order to address the fact that news broadcasts were not 
isolated but rather were intermixed with political advertisements and potentially 
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conflicting ideologies were presented, I think the remedy here is simply; merely show 
participants isolated clips or information that is void of political advertisements or 
potential confounders. Doing so will resolve Iyengar and Kinder’s mistake while also 
boosting the conclusiveness of my research. Finally, I hope to address the fact that 
Iyengar and Kinder used only television news to establish their conclusions by expanding 
my experiments to include other forms of news and information exposure that will be 
discussed later. Doing so will pinpoint whether specific forms of information and media 
exposure are more prominent in their ability to sway the respondent’s opinion.  
Continuing with the literature review, I will also assess the claims made by 
Hochschild and Einstein in Do Facts Matter?: Information and Misinformation in 
American Politics. This publication breaks down a series of illustrations in which the 
authors attempt to pinpoint which kind of political information sways collective or 
individual opinions across a range of policy issues and spectrums.7 The authors juxtapose 
their two central ideas of omission and commission.8 The former they define as the 
neglecting, whether intentional or not, of certain facts regarding a policy. The latter, 
which worries the authors more so than omission, involves people taking false facts or 
data and then acting around and based on those falsehoods. This is nearly directly related 
with the idea of misinformation. Ultimately, they conclude that commission is more 
                                                
7 Hochschild, J. L. (2016). Do facts matter?: Information and misinformation in 
american politics. Place of publication not identified: Univ Of Oklahoma Press. 
8 Ibid. 
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problematic than omission, because it poses a far greater threat to a democratic political 
system.9 It tricks citizens into believing certain “facts” and then causes them to react and 
vote based off of those false premises. Even more concerning, these falsehoods often 
stem from political elites, who play a vital role in “informing, misinforming, 
encouraging, or discouraging” certain kinds of political knowledge over others, including 
false information.10 Here, the source of the information also plays a role. It is coming 
from political elite who people, depending on their ideology, are more likely to believe 
and gain facts from. The more concerning part of the problem occurs when people accept, 
take on, and act off of the false facts that the members of their own ideology present. For 
Hochschild and Einstein, the emphasis is not solely on lack of information (although the 
authors do express worries about this), but rather misinformation that is damaging to a 
political system.  
 To conduct their experiments, the authors rely on a series of polls regarding 
specific political policy or general political beliefs. For example, Hochschild and Einstein 
examine policy fields, such as child vaccination, support for the Iraq war, Iraq’s alleged 
holding of weapons of mass destruction, and whether President Barack Obama was born 
in the United States or not. They examine such questions across informed or misinformed 
policy groups, across party identification, and across race. They find that elected officials 
                                                
9 Ibid. 
10  Ibid. 
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greatly “alienated” their constituencies in these policy areas.11 They find a greater 
preponderance of people acting on misinformation rather than lack or neglect of 
information, and the political ramifications can be tumultuous. It is clear that commission 
is just as large of a problem as omission. Not only are people not gathering the entire 
spectrum of facts regarding a policy area, but they are also acting upon information that is 
simply not true. It is the deliberate concealment and manipulation of facts that are the 
main concern for Einstein and Hoschild.  
The rhetoric regarding “fake news,” or false information that Hochshild and 
Einstein focus on, was expanded upon even more around the time of the 2016 election. 
The election saw the resurgence of information politics and media effects in the field of 
political science, largely promulgated by President Trumps’ claims. A myriad of ones had 
been published to address the questions of “What constitutes fake news?” and “Why do 
people believe fake news?” To begin with. Allcot and Gentzkow’s “Social Media and 
Fake News in the 2016 Election” looked at these very questions, while shifting the focus 
to the spread of misinformation across social media. The latter constitutes an analysis of 
fake news stories that were shared around the time that Trump announced his presidency 
and following into the actual election.12 Important to note, no specific experiment occurs, 
as will in this analysis. Pennycook et al’s “Prior exposure increases perceived accuracy of 
                                                
11 Ibid. 
12 Allcott, H & Gentzkow, M 2017, 'Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election' 
Journal of Economic Perspectives. 
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fake news”13 dealt with similar issues. In all of these authors’ findings, they mark social 
media as the culprit for spreading misinformation and allowing people to hold beliefs that 
they might not hold otherwise. The power of information, news, and now, social media, 
in buttressing your opinions cannot be denied. The reason for mentioning these specific 
pieces include the fact that they are the initial authors who were becoming increasingly 
concerned with the ability for social media, specifically, to manipulate people’s opinions. 
This thesis will go one step further in providing a specific controlled experiment, which 
aims to show how different social media sources impact people’s opinions. 
 So, then, what exactly is the problem with Hochshild and Einsteins’ or the other 
authors’ conclusions? Not much. In fact, many of their conclusions stem reasonably from 
their methods and studies. My broader reason for breaking down their pieces is that it 
reinforces a narrative among political scientists that focuses on misinformation and not 
motivated reasoning. Importantly, the authors’ work does cover a broader range of policy 
issues than the motivated reasoning pieces; but, because the piece focuses on 
misinformation, it cannot conclusively tell us much about, more generally, exposure to 
new information and how that impacts the political psyche. Last, the concern regarding 
social media also arises.  
                                                
13 Pennycook, Gordon and Cannon, Tyrone and Rand, David G., Prior Exposure 
Increases Perceived Accuracy of Fake News (May 3, 2018). Forthcoming in Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General.  
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Perhaps no single book has been so essential in explaining public opinion than 
John Zaller’s The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion.14 Zaller’s basic argument comes 
two-fold; it is concerned first with deconstructing the notion that voters hold structured 
frameworks for preferences and second on the role of political elites. Zaller breaks down 
the commonly-held idea that individuals possess belief structures off of which they form 
their opinions on issues. Instead, “political communications become considerations in a 
person’s mind;” it is the facts and thoughts that are ‘most immediately salient’ that people 
use to respond.15 Thus, the reason that variation exists from one response to the next is 
the fact that “what is at the top of a person’s head varies stochastically over time.”16 
Zaller distinguishes that these aren’t random responses to survey questions, but rather 
ones that utilize a different mix of considerations that causes individuals to “vacillate in 
their responses within a certain, systematically determined range.”17 Broader attitude 
changes are attributed to people’s long-term response probabilities, resulting from a 
change in the mix of ideas to which people are exposed. Further, Zaller dedicates an 
entire chapter of his book to explain individual variations in receptivity of elite’s 
discussions, a concept which he calls “response instability.” Now, let’s move on to how 
                                                
14 Zaller, John R. The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. Cambridge University Press, 
2011. 
15 Ibid, 266. 
16 Ibid, 266. 
17 Ibid, 266. 
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Zaller views the role of elites in the political system. For Zaller, elite discourse on 
political matter plays a central role in explaining the shaping of public opinion. Zaller 
argues that elite’s discussion of politics is one of the heaviest influences on manipulating 
and molding public opinion. There are then further variations in how individuals respond 
to the political communications from elites. This variation in responsiveness is attributed 
directly to varying levels in political awareness. The individuals in a system with higher 
political awareness are correlated with greater consistency and stability of political 
opinions. Throughout the entire book, Zaller also mentions talk of the effects of political 
campaigns and personal values in mildly influencing opinion. Zaller’s discussion on 
elites in the political sphere is one that mirrors many of the sentiments expressed by 
Einstein and Hoschild. 
 The main issues I found with Zaller are as follows. He consistently makes the 
point that the most prevalent issues are the ones that come to mind. However, to go so far 
as to say that political elites play the most prominent role in bringing issues to the 
forefront of public debate seriously undermines the power of the media in swaying 
opinion. Although my research will not be directly competing with Zaller’s, it will 
intensify the role that media outlets and information news sources have in shaping 
opinion, where Zaller gives little weight to them before. In fact, Zaller goes on to 
discredit the role of the media, in part in the appendix, because he finds it improbable to 
distinguish between “low brow” and “high brow” forms of media. The former is related 
more to popular news sources, such as People magazine and talk show radio versus the 
latter which consists of TV network news, National Public Radio and the Wall Street 
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Journal.18 I think that this point that Zaller brings up is actually quite valid and a serious 
concern. It made me think of the countless stories I’ve seen on my social media feed from 
news sources such as Buzzfeed or Vox, which are not entirely reputable political sources 
and have a hidden agenda of catering to the mass public in an attempt to increase shares 
and likes on a piece. I think that I would need to account for this in my experiments by 
potentially making a separate test group that is exposed to “low brow” media while 
another is exposed to “high brow” media. This would address Zaller’s concern that it is 
difficult to measure changes based on low brow or high brow sources.   
Expanding upon Converse’s prior works, Edward Dreyer provides some insight 
into how political information exposure affects voters, though applying that theory to the 
context of presidential campaigns. Dreyer’s main contribution to the field is working with 
and expanding the “floating voter” hypothesis. That is, the idea that voters that are least 
exposed to current political information tend to change their vote preferences more 
readily within a single campaign as well as switch their vote from one party to the other 
after two successive election.19 Dreyer measures inter-election changes and stability in 
partisan preferences by comparing the proportion of those supporting the same party by 
exposure to political communication across a range of panels, including Converse's in 
                                                
18 Ibid, 334. 
19 Dreyer, Edward C. “Media Use and Electoral Choices: Some Political Consequences of 
Information Exposure.” The Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 35, no. 4, 1971, pp. 544–553. 
JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/2747671. 
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1956, Butler and Stoke's in 1960, and the American SRC from 1960 and 1964. Dreyer 
concludes that the “the less involved or floating voter tends to drop out of the off-year 
electorate, as evidenced by the rather dependable 10 to 20 percentage point decline in 
voter turnout when compared with the turnout rate in the preceding presidential contest.” 
The reason for this change in voter turnout stems directly from the ‘diffuse flow of new 
stimuli;’ it is this new stimuli, which comes in the form of new information, data, or 
political advertisements and campaigns, that drives the percentage change. Dreyer further 
confirms prior knowledge that strong identifiers are more likely to remain stagnant in 
their beliefs and support their party’s nominee more regularly than do the floating-in-and-
out. 
Dreyer’s conclusions are also important, but there are also limiting factors to 
consider here. First, Dreyer is looking mainly at presidential elections and information 
during election periods, whereas I am concerned with broader policy implications. 
Particularly, they won’t be limited to a specific period. There is the additional limitation 
that the studies occurred during election years, which makes certain issues more salient 
than others and to the forefront of the national spotlight. Because the new information 
and stimuli came about at election time, people might be more prone and subject to either 
changing or confirming their opinion since political discussion is heightened. Also, it 
might be important to highlight that some of the studies used to reach the conclusions 
were over 50 years old and, in my view, do not hold the same weight that they might 
have in the past.  
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When I was able to locate research that specifically dealt with motivated 
reasoning, the findings were similar to my hypothesized ideas but required further 
explanation and insight. I’ll start by discussing the work of Taber and Lodge in Motivated 
Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs. The overarching results of the authors 
are ones that I do not disagree with and rather I think are similar to my expected findings. 
Taber and Lodge conclude that participants viewed arguments in such a way that 
“attitudinally congruent arguments are evaluated as stronger than attitudinally 
incongruent arguments.” Further, when participants were reading pro and con arguments, 
they often counter-argued the arguments that they disagreed with while supporting the 
ones that they did agree with, showing evidence of disconfirmation bias. These are 
findings that I think will present themselves in my own later experiments. However, there 
are some issues that I find with their experiments. First, I question the test subjects used 
in the experiments. Taber and Lodge recruited participants from introductory political 
science courses at Stony Brook University, and respondents received course credit for 
their participation. My main issues are as follows: first, college students, being the 
selected sample, cannot logically be representative of the entire population. The authors 
pick such as niche environment that to say that university students are representative of 
the entire American public, many citizens of whom did not attend college, would be 
inconclusive. The students were then categorized and characterized further in their being 
students of political science. Students taking political science courses, though 
introductory, are undoubtedly going to be (ideally) more versed and informed in the 
world of politics and thus less rigid in changing their opinions. Meanwhile, a randomly-
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selected member of the American public that is not as informed in politics will likely be 
more prone to the effects of motivated reasoning than, say, a student of politics. Thus, a 
more representative sample size is required to provide more conclusive results. Second, I 
take issue with the information board method of testing for the confirmation and 
disconfirmation bias. In Taber and Lodge’s experiment, participants were free to look for 
information on the computer and they were not forcefully exposed to certain other kinds 
of information. It flows logically, thus, that people sought out information that reinforced 
their previously held beliefs. It is not unreasonable to see the confirmation bias take 
effect. My issues, thus, are the fact that respondents were not forcefully exposed to 
information that they disagreed with and seeing if their opinions change, which is namely 
what I am more interested in. Because respondents were able to seek out information on 
their own volition, Taber and Lodge were not able to effectively test whether 
counterfactual information actually changed people’s opinions if respondents were never 
exposed to it in the first place. The experiments do not specifically cite whether people 
actually clicked on the section of the information board that they disagreed with, leaving 
the potential for respondents to never have actually even been exposed to information 
they disagreed with. Taber and Lodge only account for attitude changes and not whether 
actual exposure occurred, which is a further flaw. Taber and Lodge did look at reading 
times for arguments, but, interestingly, incongruent arguments took up more time.  
The final two issues revolve again around the topics as well as the sources of 
information. I do enjoy that Taber and Lodge discussed two highly controversial topics, 
affirmative action and gun control. I would argue, however, that those topics are heavily 
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influenced by race and socioeconomic status and thus might not be indicative of how 
motivated reasoning works in regards to other policy areas, which I hope to explore. Last, 
as part of the information board, Taber and Lodge use data and arguments from print and 
online publications from various interest groups. My work is different in that it hopes to 
also take a look at the effects of television media and social media in changing people’s 
views and not solely published articles.  
It is clear that selective exposure is a contested subject not just in the 
psychological academic world but also the political one. And, when we crossover two 
words with competing ideas, the challenge in defining a theory and determining its 
applicability becomes even more difficult. At every crossroad and turning point of 
political theory there is debate as to whether selective exposure takes place. Kinder 
himself (2003) argues that ‘‘despite all of the early confidence, the evidence for selective 
exposure turns out to be thin. We now know that people do not, for the most part, seek 
out mass communications that reinforce their political predispositions’’ (p. 369).20 
Likewise, Zaller’s main contribution directly competes with and aims to dismantle 
selective exposure: ‘‘Most people…are simply not so rigid in their information-seeking 
behavior that they will expose themselves only to ideas that they find congenial. To the 
extent selective exposure occurs at all, it appears to do so under special conditions that do 
                                                
20 Stroud, Natalie Jomini. "Media use and Political Predispositions: Revisiting the 
Concept of Selective Exposure." Political Behavior 30.3 (2008): 341-66. ProQuest. Web. 
14 Mar. 2019. 
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not typically arise in situations of mass persuasion’’ (p. 139).21 For Zaller, it is a series of 
specific factors that are actively influencing choices that vary from one decision-making 
standpoint to another. Opinions are not rigid but rather can fluctuate depending on those 
factors that Zaller examines. Yet, we also see contrary perspectives that affirm selective 
exposure. Jonas et al. (2005) contend that ‘‘When searching for new information, people 
are often biased in favor of previously held beliefs, expectations, or desired conclusions’’ 
(p. 978).22 All of these conflicting ideas very clearly confuse our issue, so the purpose of 
this thesis is to further hone our working definition and ensure that we have a clear 
understanding of how selective exposure works. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
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Theory 
 My theory is based largely in many of the findings by the authors whose 
arguments I have now dissected. It is clear that there are conflicting ideas on whether 
people are prone to changing their opinions upon the exposure of new information. In my 
view, there are certain kinds of information that people are more prone to changing their 
minds than others. Namely, it is those political issues that revolve around morality, early 
upbringing, and personal values that are least likely to change. These political issues tend 
to include issues such as gay marriage or abortion which are largely fueled by such 
experiences. On the other hands, political issues that are based off math, statistics, or 
factual, observable data are the ones that people are most willing to change their opinion. 
These political issues are those that revolve around topics such as the economy, which 
tends to include much more concrete, quantitative data that can be used to convince and 
more easily sway people’s opinions.  
 Now, let’s discuss the difference between social media in its ability to convince 
and sway versus the New York Times Article that people will be exposed to. I expect that 
the social media is going to be less persuasive in its ability to convince people. Social 
media, I predict, will see lower levels of opinion change. The reason that I believe this 
will take place is due to the fact that many people tend to be more skeptical of posts on 
social media, whether it be from family or friends. People tend to be more apprehensive 
of and challenging towards information on Facebook or Twitter that are sharing political 
posts. We often hear of how people are “sick of” seeing political issue wars breaking out 
online and how their timelines are flooded with tons of news articles shared by others that 
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they know. However, I do believe that much of the information will follow the prior 
findings by experts in the field. In this way, this thesis is merely an extension of their 
prior work and applying it to a new field – the intersection of social media and political 
science.  
 Overall, people are going to be more likely to be swayed by certain issue types 
that others. Further, I expect that people will be less likely to confirm their opinions with 
the digital article. They will be more likely to confirm their own opinion, whether it 
disagrees or agrees with the stated piece, for the social media post. 
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Experiment Design  
Now, I will begin to define how my personal research experiment will take place. 
My design draws inspiration from Iyengar and Kinder’s experiment with some 
“tweaking.” It will consist of a controlled study in which participants are exposed to new 
information across a variety of media technologies. The test groups will consist of 
randomly selected participants.  Before participants actually are “exposed” to the new 
information, they will be instructed to complete a questionnaire that establishes their 
base-level opinions on a wide range of issues. I will purposely make that list expansive 
and cover social politics, foreign politics, and more; the reasoning for this is that 
respondents won’t be able to anticipate what questions they might be asked about or what 
policy sphere they might be discussing. For example, opinions on common political 
issues such as abortion will be polled, but I also think it’s important to ask about local 
politics so that participants can’t pre-determine what the controlled topics will be about. 
In compiling the preliminary data, I will include both a five-point-thermometer scale as 
well as “blank space” in order for respondents to write their opinions if they choose not to 
use the scale. The thermometer ratings will range from “strongly disagree, somewhat 
disagree, no opinion, somewhat agree, and strongly agree.” I would compile a mean for 
the results and see how closely the mean of post-coverage answers deviates from the 
mean for pre-coverage. This will help to provide a statistical way to analyze changes and 
provide some math-based evidence for my thesis. 
 After this section, participants will be exposed to one of three media “routes” 
corresponding to one of three issue topics. The media forms will include television 
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broadcasting, social media coverage, and print paper articles, while the issue topics will 
revolve around race, social welfare, and abortion. Specifically, the issues I have chosen 
are as follows. For race, respondents will be shown media coverage regarding the George 
Zimmerman case and the killing of Trayvon Martin, emphasizing facts such as Martin 
being unarmed or that Zimmerman was asked not to approach the suspected person 
(Martin), and that the Sanford police didn’t arrest Zimmerman. It will also include 
general statistics on police brutality against blacks and responses to the ‘blue lives 
matter’ movement. For welfare, respondents will be shown coverage about welfare 
recipients and welfare abuse statistics; specifically; how white Americans are the biggest 
recipients of welfare and how the welfare queen stereotype largely is a myth. For 
abortion, respondents will be exposed to facts regarding health concerns with illegal 
abortions, such as the use of toxic chemicals or using objects harmful to a woman’s body. 
For each of these policy issues, the topics are highly controversial. The purpose of the 
controversiality is to illicit a legitimate response from the reader and ensure that they are 
interested in (hopefully) or captivated by the topic at hand. After the group at large is 
divided into the topics mentioned, there will be a further division among the groups. They 
will be split up among different media styles. Some will be shown video news coverage, 
while others will read print articles and the third group viewing social media stories. The 
purpose of doing so is to test the efficacy of different media outlets in shaping opinion. I 
suspect that certain routes might be more effective than others. Last, I am definitely 
amenable to expanding the scope the topics covered so that we can gain a more 
generalized viewpoint on which policy areas are more subject to the priming effects.  
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 After the exposure occurs, respondents will then be asked to rate themselves on 
the same thermometer scale as before with a blank space as well. The ratings will be 
recorded and tallied in order to assess variance from the original response. Further, 
respondents will be asked altogether “Did your original response change after 
watching/reading/viewing the source of information?” Respondents will then be asked 
how strongly the information affected their opinion in the same five-point scale. There 
might be some potential confounders in these situations, such as the emotional nature of 
the information topics, but I anticipate that it would be difficult to account for all of them 
without performing several multivariate regressions. 
 After the election of Donald Trump, many pollsters might agree with me in saying 
that predicing political outcomes is quite difficult. For that reason, I don’t want to make 
any specific conclusions about how the experiment will turn out. However, speaking 
broadly, I feel that people will be more likely to change their opinions for social issues 
and less likely to change them for racial ones. My reasoning for this is that people might 
be more grounded in their racial beliefs, since they are deeply personal, potentially moral, 
and highly receptive to personal life experiences. Meanwhile, the issue of abortion might 
be more subject to scientific enlightening that might sway a person’s opinion. I truly do 
not know how the economic issues will play out. My expected findings are that people 
are more likely to be susceptible to the priming effect for economic issues, but less likely 
in racial and social issues. I do not think that people are quick to change their opinion on 
issues that are influenced highly by perspectives of personal relationships and morality 
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(e.g., gay marriage or abortion). The deviation is likely to be higher for economic issues 
and lower for the others.  
To say that the already-existing literature is inconclusive would be foolish. 
Rather, I would say that my research question is ostensibly different from prior works. 
My work attempts to answer important questions about which policy areas are subject to 
selective exposure and which media forms are more persuasive. My research design is 
looking at areas of information that were not necessarily in the spotlight before and 
certainly were not hypothesized about. With the previous works in the field, we see a 
continuance that focuses on misinformation. The theme is consistently experimenting 
with how false information and how that has broader impacts for political science. All of 
the previous authors focused on misinformation and its ramifications. My work is distinct 
in that it seeks to examine an otherwise-understudied realm of exposure to information. 
Currently, the literature revolves around misinformation and how it affects citizens versus 
how exposure to information can play an active role in shaping and defining people’s 
viewpoints. My main interest is not in studying this field. Rather, it is exposure to 
information that concerns me and makes me question whether people are actually open or 
willing to change their opinion based off such exposure. It is applying the psychological 
theory of selective exposure to the field of political science that fascinates me.  
 There is no question that media coverage and information access can have 
profound ramifications. However, we need to be more holistic in how we approach the 
field in order to properly assess what that role is. My research would hope to bridge the 
gaps between policy issues and clarify whether exposure to information is significant 
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across a range of policy issues. It expands the scope of findings to include myriad of 
pertinent topics that we see shared on the very ‘timelines’ of our family members 
attempting to articulate their opinions and ideally change our own. It further helps us 
understand what information sways people’s opinions and what does not. More broadly, 
the implications of information consumption is critical to a functioning government. A 
democracy can only function properly if its members are educated about the topics being 
collectively decided upon. If we expect our democracy to be well-informed, we need to 
better realize which forms of media are able to inform and not merely to misinform. 
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Results 
 An experiment was conducted during the month of March to test out my prior 
hypotheses. The design was submitted to the IRB for approval in late January/early 
February and was distributed the week after final approval came at the end of March. The 
IRB approval number is # 5085C and was conducted by principal investigator Spencer 
Piston. 
 Let’s begin by analyzing the demographics of the participants. Survey results 
were collected via Qualtrics. 1,500 people were originally requested to take the survey, 
but I received only 972 responses at the time of analyzing the data. The survey began by 
asking general demographic and identifiable information. Respondents were asked to 
provide their age, race, gender, highest-level of education completed, party identification, 
ideology, the candidate for whom they voted in the 2016 election, and their household 
income. A breakdown of all of the demographics is provided in the following bar graphs 
showing the number of respondents that fit into a specific category. Although we 
encouraged participants to answer all questions, they had the ability to skip questions as 
well. This is reflected as ‘99’ in my data and represents certain discrepancies in the 
number of responses. 
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After answering the preliminary demographics questions, respondents were guided 
through a variety of questions composed by different theses-writers. All of the different 
experiments and designs of different students were combined into one giant survey and 
experiment design. The total amount of questions administered spanned 180 when 
409
32
249
18 24
240
H I L LARY 	C L INTON 	 GARY 	JOHNSON 	 DONALD 	TRUMP 	 J I L L 	 ST E IN 	 OTHER 	CAND IDATE I 	DON ’T 	KNOW
2016	PRESIDENTIAL	VOTE
421
223 2
80
48
L E SS 	 THAN 	$ 50 , 000 $51 , 000 - $ 100 , 000 $101 , 000 -$ 200 , 000 MORE 	 THAN 	$ 201 , 000
HOUSEHOLD	INCOME
Figure 7 
Figure 8 
  
35 
combining everyone’s work. My questions were the final three that were asked in the 
survey.  
 When participants arrived at my portion of the experiment, they were exposed to 
one of two articles. Both of the articles contained the exact same information. The article 
presented facts and arguments regarded income inequality, pointing out concerns with 
CEO pay and comparing them to employee salaries. The articles, however, were different 
in their appearance and presentation. One of the articles presented itself as a screenshot of 
the New York Times’ website. The other article was a social media post (specifically 
Facebook). The only difference in the two forms was the media type and the form to 
which respondents were exposed. Nothing else differed. Figure 1 displays the New York 
Times Article that some respondents were exposed to, while Figure 2 shows the 
Facebook/social media post that the other group was exposed to. Again, the contents of 
each were purposely made to be similar.  
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The purpose of doing so was to measure whether the social media post is any 
more convincing in altering the mind and perception of the person reading it. 480 people 
were exposed to the New York Times Article and 492 were exposed to the social media 
post. The process of assigning people to the posts was completely arbitrarily and 
determined by the Qualtrics software.   
 Upon reading the article, participants were asked to answer the following three 
questions:  
1. The author states that the top 1% take home what fraction of the national 
income today? 
2. Did your opinion on income inequity in the United States change after reading 
this article? If yes, how so, and if not, why?  
3. The author points out that CEOs earn about 380 times more than their average 
employee. That rate would be even higher for lower ranked employees, such 
as janitors. Does this impact your opinion on whether CEOs and their 
employees are fairly paid? 
Question one was an intentional diagnostic question aimed at determining how intently 
the reader skimmed the article. The answer to this question was one-fourth. Only 313 of 
the respondents returned with the correct answer. 224 voted for one-tenth, 171 for one-
half, and 263 for three quarters. Roughly 1/3 of the respondents answered correctly. 
These are the responses overall. The breakdown of this question depending on the article 
that respondents were exposed to is as follows: 
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The author states that the top 1% take home what fraction of the national income 
today? (New York Times Article Responses) 
One tenth 111 (23.3%)  
One quarter 153 (32.1%) 
One half 82 (171.2%) 
Three quarters 131 (27.46%) 
 
The author states that the top 1% take home what fraction of the national income 
today? (Social Media Post Responses) 
One tenth 113 (23.1%) 
One quarter 158 (32.3%) 
One half 88 (18%) 
Three quarters 130 (26.6%) 
 
After this initial diagnostic question, respondents were asked to clarify if a change 
in opinion occurred as a result of reading the article. This question was a free-form 
response, which meant that respondents could answer with random, non-answers. Any 
response which failed to answer the question asked or mentioned anything not-related to 
the questions at hand was flagged and removed from the data for this question. Then, all 
of the remaining questions were parsed by me and assigned a variable from 0 to 5. A ‘0’ 
meant that the reader underwent no change in opinion; ‘1’ meant the reader indicated a 
change; ‘3’ meant that the reader did not properly answer; ‘4’ meant that the reader 
Figure 11 
Figure 12 
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indicated somewhat of a change; and ‘5’ meant that the reader indicated that they are 
unable to form an opinion with the facts given. After assigning each response one of 
these variables, I begin to examine the changes in answers between the New York Times 
exposure group and the social media exposure group.  
Did your opinion on income inequity in the United States change after reading this 
article? If yes, how so, and if not, why? (New York Times Article Responses) 
No change 310 (64%) 
Change 55 (11%) 
Somewhat change 1 (.2%) 
Cannot form opinion 27 (5.6%) 
No response 90 (18.6%) 
 
Did your opinion on income inequity in the United States change after reading this 
article? If yes, how so, and if not, why? (Social Media Post Responses) 
No change 331 (67%) 
Change 58 (12%) 
Somewhat change 3 (.6%) 
Cannot form opinion 26 (5.3%) 
No response 76 (15.38%) 
 
 In parsing through the data, I noticed a trend in many of the responses that 
indicated “no change” to question two. Since the response was free-form, respondents 
Figure 13 
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were able to explain their reasoning for their selection. I noticed that many respondents 
elected that the article only confirmed that which they already believe. So, I decided to 
add an additional measure that looked at which amount of responses that did not undergo 
a change in opinion indicated a confirmation bias. 64 respondents out of the 310 that 
indicated there was no change (upon exposure to the New York Times article) also 
indicated that they experienced a confirmation of their prior held beliefs. 61 respondents 
of the 331 for the social media post did the same.  
 The final question drew out what I found to be the most shocking piece of 
information regarding income inequality. It articulated that CEOs make upwards of 380 
times more than their lowest paid employee (not even counting custodial staff who get 
paid even lower than the average). The purpose of doing so was to provide a startling 
statistic that would surely change the mind of any logical person who would object to 
CEOs making exponentially more than their average-paid worker. The results are as 
follows. 
 
 
The author points out that CEOs earn about 380 times more than their average 
employee. That rate would be even higher for lower ranked employees, such as 
janitors. Does this impact your opinion on whether CEOs and their employees are 
fairly paid? (New York Times Article Responses) 
No change 188 (39.2%) 
Change 292 (60.8%) 
Figure 15 
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The author points out that CEOs earn about 380 times more than their average 
employee. That rate would be even higher for lower ranked employees, such as 
janitors. Does this impact your opinion on whether CEOs and their employees are 
fairly paid? (Social Media Post Responses) 
No change 185 (37.68%) 
Change 306 (62.32%) 
Figure 16 
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Analysis 
 To sufficiently analyze the results, I will be breaking down the responses 
question-by-question, starting with the first. I will determine what the main payoffs and 
insights from each question are, as well as potential confounders that are present 
throughout. The main theme relating all of the responses are that we see an almost 
identical split for the responses between all of the options available. The percentages 
converge to the same number for nearly every response, no matter what the question 
being asked is. 
Question One 
 Luckily, the correct answer for the first question, one quarter, did attract the 
majority of correct answers. For both responses, roughly one third of respondents chose 
the correct answer. No significant differences in answers occurred between the New York 
Times piece and the social media post. Although one quarter was the highest response 
chosen individually, overall, most people (roughly two thirds) chose the wrong answer). 
The disappointing part of the responses for this question is that the majority of 
respondents overall returned an incorrect answer. Again, we see a similar response rate 
for the incorrect answers as we did for the correct one with no significantly different 
outliers. There was no major variance in choices of the incorrect answers between the 
New York Times piece and the social media post.  
 The intent in asking this question was to impose a general diagnostic assessment 
of how well respondents captured the essence of and information in the piece. The 
response rate does seem disappointing. It could be argued that survey participants did not 
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accurately, thoroughly, or fully read the article. In turn, they might not have understood 
the purpose or message being conveyed. In defense of the readers, though, I will point out 
that the question asked was incredibly particularistic and specific; thus, it would be 
entirely less likely for the respondent to have answered correctly. In addition, respondents 
were not able to reference the article. Once the article was shown, readers have to move 
on from that screen altogether and begin answering the questions. So, if readers were 
skimming the piece and not reading it accurately, they would have had no way of 
determining what the correct answer was.  
Question Two 
 Question two provided the most difficulty in terms of assessing results.  Part of 
this was my own error in making it a free-response question. However, I felt that doing so 
would best allow me to gauge how people’s opinions changed. Moreover, I knew that I 
would be including question three which would consist of a simple yes-no dynamic. This 
question provided for a bit more variety to the responses.  
 As might occur with any free-form type of question, a small fraction of responses 
either did not answer the question whatsoever, skipped the question, or provided an 
unknown response. All of these responses were coded as ‘no response’ to maintain 
consistency and ensure that they did not skew the change or no change results. Both 
forms of media yielded nearly the same ‘no response rate,’ around 15% (3.6 percentage 
points more for the New York Times piece). An even smaller fraction (~5%) of 
respondents for either media form were unable to answer the question given the limited 
information that they had access to. I appreciate their honesty. And, finally, the smallest 
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amount of respondents (.2%-.6% for the New York Times or Facebook post, 
respectively) indicated somewhat of a change. The difficulty in analyzing this question is 
the inability to determine how much of a change occurred and what the survey taker 
meant by “somewhat.” 
 The most interesting part of the analysis revolves around the fact that nearly two 
thirds of respondents did not undergo a change in their opinion as a result of being 
exposed to this information. The response rates did not vary significantly for the New 
York Times piece over the social media post. Both media forms were consistent in that 
they were unable to persuade the majority of opinions of readers. 
 I will say that I was surprised by the results of the New York Times article more 
so than I was for the Facebook post. The findings of the Facebook post conform to my 
original theory. I did not expect that the Facebook post was going to be persuasive in 
changing people’s perspectives very much. What’s disappointing from the results is that 
the New York Times article was just as ineffective as the Facebook post in being unable 
to sway opinion. People were just as likely to not be swayed by the Times piece than they 
were by the Facebook post, even though the information is exactly identical. This does 
not necessarily fit with my theory, since I expected a higher rate of change from the New 
York Times piece. The reasoning behind this is that the New York Times is a bit more 
trusted and a credible source than the average social media post that you see on 
Facebook. Typically, Facebook posts are not as intensive or long in real life as 
participants might encounter in the survey experiment. So, I would not expect that the 
majority of people are going to take their time and read the posts, so they are not as likely 
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to be persuasive. So, to think that the New York Times and social media post were 
equally as unconvincing was a bit disheartening. 
Question Three 
 In designing question three, I kept in mind my concern for question one in which 
readers were not able to reference the article in order to answer the question. So, for 
question three, I purposely decided to include the factual information so that this problem 
would not resurface.  
 Overall, the responses to question three followed the same response rate. 
Responses were distributed roughly 60% in favor of change and 40% indicating that no 
change had occurred. We do see a 2% reversal in answers for the NYT piece versus the 
social media post (39/61 split versus 37/63 split), but the data reflects the overall trends 
of the responses converging.  
 The main purpose of this question was to determine whether a change from the 
pieces occurred. I am glad to report that this does in fact seem to be the case. Both outlets 
reflected a change in the person’s opinion as a result of the exposure to the new 
information. So, this does support my overall thesis that people are going to undergo a 
change in their opinion. In addition, it is important to note that this policy realm directly 
reflects and mirrors the ones that I predicted would be subject to change in my theory 
section. The entire article revolved around income inequality and issues regarding the 
economy. In addition, the article mentions several factual data observations and statistics 
intended to persuade the reader. This question in specific cites a fact. Due to this, it is 
clear that the responses align with the predicted outcomes and theory that I outlined prior.  
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 One of the main downfalls of this question is its inability to measure the direction 
of change. As a result, it cannot accurately provide an ordinal or thermometer rating that 
specifies the degree to which change occurs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
48 
Survey Limitations  
 In writing this Master’s thesis, there had been a variety of issues that both limited 
and restricted the ability to complete a holistic and thorough analysis regarding motivated 
reasoning and information exposure. In a traditional PhD or Masters programs, students 
typically devote the majority of their final few year(s) to a thesis alone. However, with 
the political science BAMA program, students are required to also maintain a full 
coursework in addition to writing the thesis. This reality, in combination with several 
other factors that will follow, meant that the experiment design for this specific thesis 
was limited in several factors.  
 The first limiting factor in this experiment was its inability to examine a breadth 
of policy areas. When initially crafting the design of the experiment, my hope was to be 
able to take a look at how selective exposure and motivated reasoning applied across 
different policy areas. It was my intention to be able to survey participants on a wide 
range of issues. Ideally, the experiment that we conducted would then be applied twice 
more. I had already put together drafts of experiments for the issues of abortion and race 
measured via stances on affirmative action. With the abortion issue, respondents would 
have been exposed to statistics regarding abortion and how unsafe, illegal abortions can 
cause unnecessary and extensive complications for the women who undergo them. With 
the issue of race, the information guided respondents through a historical analysis and 
documentation of affirmative action and its necessity for minorities. 
 The purpose of studying these several policy areas is to observe whether different 
policy areas elicit different changes in respondents’ behavior when it comes to opinion. 
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In the study that I conducted, the only policy area that respondents were asked about 
revolved around the economy and income inequality. Thus, I do not believe that it is 
conclusive to say that the results from this experiment are applicable across differences in 
policy areas. For example, respondents’ opinions might change different to information 
exposure to different issue spheres, such as abortion or race, and this experiment is not 
sufficient in determining whether the results here are applicable to those separate issues. 
Had I been given additional time, resources, IRB approval, or money, then I would have 
conducted the additional experiments testing a wider scope of policy areas.  
 The second limitation that I faced in crafting this experiment was the inability to 
incorporate different media types. The experiment was limited to exposing participants to 
solely digital means – i.e., the fake social media post as well as the fake New York Times 
online article. Because the survey took place online and not in person, I was not able to 
show respondents physical newspaper articles, books, or even educational videos. My 
original experiment design actually heavily incorporated educational news clips and 
documentaries regarding each of the three previously mentioned policy areas. I went 
ahead and transcribed the exact recordings of those videos and transformed the 
transcriptions into the fake articles. However, I was unable to execute and incorporate 
these videos into the experiment due to limitations with the software used.  
 The purpose of the additional media types is to create a greater analysis as to 
which types of media are persuasive and which ones are not. In the experiment that I did 
conduct, the participants were only exposed to digital media in one of two forms, either 
digital newspaper or social media post. Thus, it is safe to conclude that the conclusions 
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from the data can only serve as evidence towards digital media. The question as to which 
other types of media – which could contain the same exact information as was embedded 
in the methods used – remains. Further, those forms of media could be either less or more 
efficacious in their ability to sway the respondents’ opinion. However, the method 
executed here is more helpful in explaining how the digital sources compare to one 
another and thus might not be directly applicable to other unexamined forms of media. 
The way to reconcile this potential problem is to reconsider that much of the existing data 
and studies already center around traditional forms of media, such as television or print 
publications. Thus, the merit in conducting these experiments was to shed light on these 
specific previously unstudied forms of media.  
 The final limitation worth mentioning is in regards to measuring the alleged 
“change” as a result of the exposure to the information in each of the posts. Because of 
the limitations in the number of questions that I was allowed to ask (given time and 
funding), I was unable to ask questions that measured the direction of change in opinion 
that occurred after exposure to the articles. Respondents were free to indicate that a 
change occurred for their questions, but they were not entirely able to specify in which 
manner their opinion change. Although some respondents did, none of the questions were 
able to determine which way the opinion change or whether it reinforced prior-held 
beliefs. Being able to measure the direction of the change is important because it would 
further contribute to questions about whether information exposure merely reinforces 
already-held beliefs or whether it changes them altogether. So, while many participants 
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did indicate a change in their opinion, the survey is unable to measure how that very 
opinion actually morphed. 
 Many of the restrictions that I have discussed are easily fixable, and the 
experiments themselves are rather easy to mimic. Had I had enough time to conduct all of 
the experiments, I would have been able to come to broader conclusions to the other 
policy areas that I was interested in.  
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Conclusion 
 
 This thesis has been an exploration of the major works regarding information 
politics, media, and how exposure to information changes or fails to change people’s 
already opinions. Often, exposure merely reinforces the prior stereotypes and beliefs that 
people already had, while others it tends to revert it altogether.  
 The particular nature of the experiment design in this case was intended to test 
whether we see a difference in people’s opinions as a result of being exposed to one of 
two experimental stimuli. The stimuli were identical in content but differed in their 
appearance; one reflected a faux New York Times article and the other a faux Facebook 
post. Although expecting initially to find a divergence in how opinions were affected by 
each of the stimuli, the data produced similar results suggesting that both stimuli had the 
same effects in impacting or not impacting opinion in a particular way.  
 The implications of my results contribute to the field of information politics and 
media in better telling us what kinds of information are changing opinion. The next time 
that you see an article on Facebook or Twitter reposted by a friend or family, I would 
expect that that article is not going to really change your mind; in fact, what it’s really 
going to do is reinforce that which you already believe. 
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